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or Europeans, most of the islands in the China Sea of the West Pacific inspire dreams of 
white sandy beaches and lush palm trees. The local fishermen there, however, may 
well be dreaming of a borderless region like the one most Europeans enjoy here on this 
continent. The fishermen just want to cast their nets wherever they can find fish in the 
Pacific. 
Talking recently to locals on islands in the East China Sea, including those belonging to 
Taiwan and others to Japan, one becomes more aware than ever, as a European, of the 
emptiness of the national sovereignty issue. As colonial powers, Europeans placed the 
concept of sovereignty at the centre of the international law that has evolved since the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia, which has often led them to draw arbitrary borderlines, also in Asia.  
Europe, fortunately, has learned through centuries of drifting (or ‘sleepwalking’)1 into war 
between ostentatiously ‘sovereign’ states that only by sharing and integrating this basic right 
of state control can permanent peace be possible. In a globalising world we experience the 
interdependence of our economies on a daily basis. In Asia too, few people could enjoy their 
current lifestyles without the steady flow of goods and money across the borders that claim 
to define sovereignty. National borders are only obstacles when a Smartphone crosses them 
100 times in its production line in Asia, before reaching the final market in the West. In a 
sense, one might say that North Korea is the most sovereign state in the world, yet with 
terrible consequences that we – probably only partly– understand. 
However, in political rhetoric worldwide nationalists have recently tried to reclaim territory 
and fall back on this term ‘sovereignty’, although it has lost meaning in many ways. 
‘Upstream’ national authority is gradually evaporating in the heat of global issues like the 
environment, the internet and trade that single countries can no longer solve on their own. 
‘Downstream’ there is increasing identification with regional cultures and the resulting local 
demand for more participation in decision-making. The independence debate in Scotland 
and autonomy for Mindanao in the Philippines are just two examples of a trend towards 
greater proximity in the political identities of active citizens. Technically, the digital 'death of 
                                                     
1 See the book on WWI by Christopher Clark, (2013) “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 
1914”, HarperCollins. 
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distance' greatly facilitates these tendencies towards multilevel governance and 
omnilateralism, where the 'nation' is only one among a number of entities of political power, 
ranging from the local to the global. 
China’s Premier Chou En-lai was pragmatic enough to shelve the issue of sovereignty over 
the islands in the East China Sea in order to restore normal relations with Japan, when in 
Beijing in 1972 Japan’s Prime Minister Tanaka asked him “about the issue”.2 Rather, there 
were positive proposals of a joint development of resources.  
Similarly, four decades later and after more than 17 years of negotiations, in April 2013 Japan 
and Taiwan suddenly broke down political barriers and signed a fishery agreement that 
creates and delineates common fishing zones around the fiercely contested islands. This was 
only made possible by Washington urging Tokyo to make concessions to Taipei for 
geopolitical reasons to pre-emptively discourage Taipei from cooperating with China on the 
island issue.3 The victims of this deal are the Japanese fishermen on the southernmost 
islands, who now have to share their fishing grounds more widely. They are thousands of 
kilometres away from Tokyo, but only a boat trip from Taiwan. The locals on both sides have 
long had friendly exchanges, beyond any borders or talk of sovereignty. They would have 
preferred to find some agreement among themselves, without the intervention of the 
authorities in distant capitals. 
This shows that cooperation on resources is possible, even over disputed borders. These 
unclear border issues remain in the ‘recurrent Cold War’ in East Asia, as was intended by 
John Forster Dulles when drawing up the system of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 to 
prolong the US hegemony over the region. The distance and time from Westphalia to San 
Francisco might be considerable, but in the meantime power politics in East Asia have 
apparently not advanced very much. Even in homogenous Japan and Taiwan societies 
nowadays are deeply divided on many political issues, ranging from relations with 
neighbours to nuclear energy. However, next to the often overriding and omnipresent 
business interests4 there is a broad common denominator, including with China and Korea, 
in the immense demographic dynamics of the region. Their fast-greying, not to mention 
shrinking populations are already posing the desperate question: ‘Who will pay for our 
pensions?’ Instead of solid youngster-based pyramids they see round demographic maps 
shaped like Chinese lanterns (or reverse pyramids) – representing the development of their 
ageing populations. The resulting need for welfare for the elderly might lead to a kind of 
‘geriatric peace’ in East Asia by 2030 – due to the simple economic necessity that leaves no 
room for any further expensive military build-up.5  
 
                                                     
2 See Asahi Shimbun, 26.12.2012 at 
(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/Senkaku_History/AJ201212260103). 
3  See Strategic Vision, Volume 2, Issue 11, Taipei, October 2013, p. 7. 
4 See the more comprehensive paper by Wolfgang Pape that looks at potential cooperation: 
(http://www.ceps.be/book/evolving-integration-east-asia-too-many-reservations). 
5  See Masohiro Matsumura, Europe’s World, Spring 2014/No.26, p. 42. 
